It's impossible to pinpoint exactly when our politics became concerned with equity. Attention to these concerns appears to have increased in the wake of the 2007-08 recession and Barack Obama's insurgent run in the Democratic Party's presidential primary. Since then, however, it has evolved from a necessary correction to the rise of economic inequality in the 1990s and early 2000s to an overarching political economy paradigm that now dominates Western policies and political discourse.The Truss administration's exceedingly imperfect and hastily handled tax cuts provided a temporary challenge to this prevalent view. They represented a legitimate understanding that Western governments' over-focus on demand-side redistribution has failed to achieve better rates of economic development, and that a shift to a more supply-side agenda is essential to enhance growth and dynamism in a period of economic stagnation. Our policy and political emphasis should be focused on the appropriate mix of supply-side initiatives, as well as how to pay for them in a fiscally restricted climate.This post began as a principled defense of some of the fundamental assumptions driving the Truss administration's ambitious supply-side agenda. It finished as somewhat of an obituary for its now-partially abandoned plan. Hopefully, the lesson for policymakers in Canada and elsewhere isn't that the UK government's core understanding of the need for a renewed focus on growth and dynamism was completely incorrect.
Of course, policymakers must be concerned
with achieving equity. However, equity without efficiency is not necessarily preferable to efficiency without equity. It's a prescription for long-term stagnation and zero-sum polarization. We must restore a healthier balance to our policies and politics.Sean Speer is the Hub's Editor-at-Large. He is also a university lecturer at the University of Toronto and Carleton University, as well as a think-tank researcher and columnist. He formerly worked as a senior economic adviser for Prime Minister Stephen Harper.Read more.The status of the Russian-Ukrainian war has shifted dramatically during the last few weeks. Following a summer in which Russia seized much of Donetsk and Luhansk in the east, Ukraine launched a major counter-offensive in Kherson and Kharkiv, regaining considerable territory.In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin has taken a fresh approach to the fight. His chances of achieving a military triumph in Ukraine are slim under the current circumstances. Western help has strengthened Ukraine's armed forces, making a battlefield collapse unlikely. Furthermore, Western sanctions are having a significant impact on Russia's economic stability and ability to manufacture high-tech military gear, implying that it cannot afford to remain in a stalemate indefinitely.Putin, having been denied his initial goal of complete conquest of Ukraine, must salvage all he can, in order to minimize potential internal consequences and threats to his regime's stability. Russia has clearly adjusted its policy in light of this new reality, guided by Putin's awareness of his country's political, economic, and military condition.
The first stage was a partial force mobilization
primarily to calm the military situation in eastern Ukraine. Even before the war, the Russian Army had severe manpower shortages, which were expected to worsen in the following months as tens of thousands of contract soldiers reached the end of their contracts and began to leave. Raising new units by mobilization, particularly those made up of poorly trained call-ups, is unlikely to produce the circumstances for success. However, its sheer size has the potential to stymie Ukraine's future development.Mobilization poses huge hazards for the regime. Since the beginning of the invasion, the Kremlin has carefully handled its domestic position to maintain its political support, which includes refraining from deploying conscripts and preventing significant fatalities among troops drawn primarily from western Russia.The decision to mobilize is a watershed moment, demonstrating that the Kremlin recognizes its fragile military status and believes it poses a greater threat than the political turmoil sparked by its announcement. To be clear, military mobilization can only stop the symbolic flow of blood and is not a strategy for triumph. Rather, Putin's other decisions and remarks are important to finding a path out of this mess.For example, phony referendums in occupied Ukrainian territory might support annexation by Russia. This could establish the terms for any future settlement between the warring parties. By claiming the territories currently under partial control, he has defined a significant portion of what a settlement would entail while preserving them as bargaining leverage. Ukraine has already rejected such a result. This is comprehensible given the West's overwhelming support and its recent battlefield wins.
To achieve its objectives, Russia must collapse
the alliance and force Kyiv to accept less. Before the invasion, Putin obviously saw the West as weak and feckless, a perception reinforced by his successful overseas adventures and destabilizing attempts over the last two decades. While Western nations' support for Ukraine has been extremely enduring, Putin appears to see the possibility of Russia dividing the current alliance supporting Ukraine.The new strategy is mostly geared at Germany. With the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, Berlin has become the dominant force in Europe and the lynchpin of the European alliance supporting Ukraine. By removing Germany from the united front, Putin is likely hoping to force the Ukrainian government to temper its demands and reach an agreement. It would also provide political cover for Kremlin-friendly EU member states, such as Hungary, to openly support pro-Russian stances.Germany also has various weaknesses that might be exploited, not the least of which are the country's reliance on Russian energy and its unique political sensitivities rooted in its history. Finally, Putin has real experience dealing with Germany, dating back to his stint as a KGB operative in Dresden in the 1980s. As a result, he is likely to have an intuitive awareness of the German situation, which will assist guide his approach.
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